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Cornhusker Economics
The Role of Farm Size in Crop Insurance
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

4 Wks
Ago

9-13-19

*

*

*

173.87

173.82

159.99

159.04

156.48

147.14

205.09

216.04

222.61

51.69

*

NA

71.19

87.97

69.55

150.61

159.96

152.51

380.85

395.17

399.44

4.45

3.45

3.57

3.09

3.87

3.74

7.04

7.77

7.96

496

5.98

5.63

2.82

3.01

3.06

*

*

*

The role of farm size in crop insurance has been a reoccurring U.S. political issue with multiple attempts at
legislation proposing to limit premium subsidies to
large producers. For instance, in 2015 bill S.2244,
amongst other items, proposed to cap crop insurance
premium subsidies at $40,000 per year1. The most recent attempt was made by the current administration
in mid-2017, where they introduced the same premium subsidy cap of $40,000 per year. The first mention
of the $40,000 figure emerged from a report sanctioned
by the Government Accountability Office in 2012
(GAO-14-700, 2014)2. Eventually no premium subsidy
caps were included in the 2018 Farm Bill due to push
back from farm and insurance groups3. However, premium subsidy restrictions have continually remained
at the forefront of crop insurance policy debate since
2012.
If excess crop insurance returns by large producers
exist, then they would have a competitive advantage
over their smaller counterparts, as the latter would not
have the financial ability to compete for resources. For
example, additional financial resources may be used in
the land rental and/or purchase market. A relation between farm size and crop insurance returns would provide evidence that crop insurance inefficiently reallocates resources. However, if larger producers are not
garnering excess returns from crop insurance, then any
government policy limiting their participation (for ex________________________
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1 https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/news/press/shaheen-flake-

introduce-crop-insurance-reform-bill-with-24-billion-insavings
2 https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/us/cap-on-farminsurance-subsidy-could-save-billions-report-says.html
3 https://www.farmprogress.com/insurance/caps-cropinsurance-subsidy-would-hit-family-farms
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ample a reduction in premium subsidies via some type of
cap on total premium subsidies) could change the pool of
insured in a way that would not be advantageous to the
health of the federal crop insurance program. Changing
the pool of insured could result in increased premiums
for participating producers. Increasing premiums also
results in higher government costs since both premium
subsidies and Administrative and Operating (A&O) subsidies are applied as a percentage of total premium. Higher premiums with higher subsidies also imply fewer acres
needed to hit a total premium subsidy cap. Evaluating
whether larger producers receive more in crop insurance
than smaller producers represents an important contribution to the literature given the reoccurring political pressure proposing the limitation of premium subsidies.
Historical county loss cost (indemnity/liability) represents
the primary calculation driving crop insurance premium
rating (Coble et al. 2010)4. Loss costs are calculated for
specific county production characteristics, for example,
the crop grown and farming practice such as irrigated or
rain fed, or summer fallow or continuous crop. While this
tailoring of premiums is aimed at improving actuarial
performance, it is possible that other farm specific characteristics influence indemnity payments. For the producer,
this could mean the opportunity for excess returns beyond what the government intends since those characteristics are not found in the premium rating method. For
the government, excess producer returns imply an inefficient program due to a misallocation of resources and
increase in taxpayer cost. In this article, we empirically
examine the impact of farm size on returns from crop
insurance participation. Specifically, we evaluate whether
larger producers are riskier than smaller producers. Our
analysis is based on the principle that since this characteristic is not part of the premium generating process, they
should be neutral to the return from insurance. Investigating the role of farm size gives insights into how much
influence farm structure heterogeneity has on the return
from crop insurance participation.
In our evaluation of the impact of farm size on the return
from crop insurance, we base our definition of farm size
on the total number of insured acres by each producer.
Since we only observe insured acreage in our data set, we
likely underestimate farm size due to acreage on uninsurable crops or crops that were not insured. Since we are
interested in the impact of larger farms versus the average
impact of an additional acre, we break our farm size data
into six size categories: producers (1) greater than 2000
acres , (2) between 1000 and 1999 acres, (3) between 500
_________________
4

Premiums are also loaded from state, miscellaneous
(prevented planting, replant, quality adjustment) and disaster
reserve factor loads.

and 999 acres, (4) between 200 and 499, (5) between
100 and 199 and (6) less than 100. This approach of six
distinct categories allows for a better comparison between very large and small farms than offered by the
USDA farm size categories and better than inspecting
the marginal value of an additional acre. We are interested in the outcomes from the tails of the acreage distribution.
To evaluate the relevance of farm and producer characteristics, we focus on the return from crop insurance as
a function of crop insurance contract choices, farm
characteristics and unobserved temporal and spatial
effects.
We use a highly detailed unit-level crop insurance dataset obtained from USDA’s Risk Management Agency
for our analysis. The analysis is conducted in four regions and five crops for the period 1996 to 2009, allowing us to evaluate differences between regions, leading
to improved understanding of region-specific crop insurance impacts. The four regions analyzed are Nebraska, Iowa, Montana and Oklahoma. We have data for
canola, corn and soybean producers in Iowa. Corn, soybeans and wheat data for Nebraska. Montana consists
of Barley and Wheat (both winter and spring), and in
Oklahoma we have cotton and wheat
Results
Marginal effects to evaluate our hypothesis that farm
size is neutral to crop insurance are presented in Table
1. Significant and positive marginal effects on farm size
and/or insured type provide evidence of excess returns.
For farm size, we do not find any evidence of excess
returns by larger farms in any of the four regions. This
runs counter to the results provided by Coble and Williams (2018) and may be explained by the fact that we
account for the net return from crop insurance across
fourteen years while they focus on only indemnities for
one year. We do find support for the alternate hypothesis that larger farms receive less return than their smaller counterparts. Support for the converse hypothesis
was found in both Iowa and Nebraska in three of the six
size categories in Iowa and two of six size categories in
Nebraska.
Conclusions
This paper examined the relation of farm size on the
return from crop insurance participation in four regions and five crops. Our approach is empirical, spanning 14 years (1996 to 2009) across 4 regions and 5
crops at the per acre level. Our goal was to evaluate
whether larger producers are riskier than smaller producers. We approach our problem by analyzing the per
acre net return from crop insurance participation

Table 1: Results – Farm Size Marginal Effects, $ per acre.

Variables
Size
(Base = 0 to 99 acres)
100 to 199
200 to 499
500 to 999
1000 to 1999
>2000

Iowa

Montana

Nebraska

Oklahoma

-1.43
-1.30**
-0.94***
0.75***
-0.57**

-0.02
0.02
0.00
0.06
0.20

NA
0.53
-1.22***
-0.66**
-0.32

0.18
0.07
0.27
0.20
0.39

Notes: ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.

rather than relying on totals. Comparing per acre net returns allows us to more accurately examine insurance outcome differences between farm sizes. Our empirical findings
contribute to the debate on whether large farms receive
more back from insurance participation than their smaller
counterparts.
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